Summary
This thesis focuses on government purchasing and contract distribution in varying political climates. It takes the reader inside a puzzling bureaucratic realm to investigate who the public agency purchasing process serves: the public, the contractors, or special political interests. The thesis probes and searches for proof of political influence in the awarding of contracts and investigates the distributive effects of a public agency’s contract decisions in order to answer the question: “Who wins government contracts and why?”.
A multivariate regression model is developed to provide an in-depth analysis of the economic and political factors that may influence government officials when they make contract award decisions. A general research model is used to investigate two competing explanations: (1) the policy model where the low-bidder wins the contract or (2) the self-interest model where a politically favored contractor wins the contract. Twenty-one variables are used to measure the influence of the policy model’s five economic factors: financial aspects of the firm and contract, low-bid position, price and CPI, competition, and the firm’s pricing tactics. Twenty-seven variables are used to measure the influence of the self-interest model’s five political factors: ward location, political value of era, change in elected and appointed officials, administrative review time, and contract justification.
The general research model explains change in contractor, incumbent versus challenger, for a sample of 800 annual-order contracts awarded by the Chicago Transit Authority from 1981 to 1992. The period includes four different city of Chicago mayors: Byrne, Washington, Sawyer, and Daley. Two scenarios are used to describe the joint influence of both the policy and self-interest models. Scenario A describes the circumstances under which the challenger will win an annual-order contract, and Scenario B describes the circumstances under which the challenger will win an annual-order contract. The model’s foundation is developed from several disciplines: government procurement, distributive politics and urban politics, normative expectations of political and bureaucratic actors, and cozy relationship expressed as consensus and conflict among the actors.
The general research model is also used to analyze the agency’s contract decisions under twelve other contracting circumstances. The sample is divided into seven different contract pools that represent contracts issued during each of the four mayors’ term and three types of private firms: Chicago-based firsm, DBE firms, and small firms with sales of less than $250,000 to the agency. Beside the pool analysis, a micro-analysis of mayoral influence in the agency’s contracting process is used to analyze the agency’s contract decisions under six additional contracting circumstances. The micro-analysis compares the influence of each mayor with the average influences exercised by the other three mayors and the influence of the transition between mayors with their mayoral term.
The general research model revealed that political influence was selective rather than systemic, and that the following four relationship explained change in contractor: firm size explained 6%; price and market competition explained 38%; administrative discretion explained 8%; and selective economic and political intervention explained up to 20%.
This thesis focuses on government purchasing and contract distribution in varying political climates. It takes the reader inside a puzzling bureaucratic realm to investigate who the public agency purchasing process serves: the public, the contractors, or special political interests. The thesis probes and searches for proof of political influence in the awarding of contracts and investigates the distributive effects of a public agency’s contract decisions in order to answer the question: “Who wins government contracts and why?”.
A multivariate regression model is developed to provide an in-depth analysis of the economic and political factors that may influence government officials when they make contract award decisions. A general research model is used to investigate two competing explanations: (1) the policy model where the low-bidder wins the contract or (2) the self-interest model where a politically favored contractor wins the contract. Twenty-one variables are used to measure the influence of the policy model’s five economic factors: financial aspects of the firm and contract, low-bid position, price and CPI, competition, and the firm’s pricing tactics. Twenty-seven variables are used to measure the influence of the self-interest model’s five political factors: ward location, political value of era, change in elected and appointed officials, administrative review time, and contract justification.
The general research model explains change in contractor, incumbent versus challenger, for a sample of 800 annual-order contracts awarded by the Chicago Transit Authority from 1981 to 1992. The period includes four different city of Chicago mayors: Byrne, Washington, Sawyer, and Daley. Two scenarios are used to describe the joint influence of both the policy and self-interest models. Scenario A describes the circumstances under which the challenger will win an annual-order contract, and Scenario B describes the circumstances under which the challenger will win an annual-order contract. The model’s foundation is developed from several disciplines: government procurement, distributive politics and urban politics, normative expectations of political and bureaucratic actors, and cozy relationship expressed as consensus and conflict among the actors.
The general research model is also used to analyze the agency’s contract decisions under twelve other contracting circumstances. The sample is divided into seven different contract pools that represent contracts issued during each of the four mayors’ term and three types of private firms: Chicago-based firsm, DBE firms, and small firms with sales of less than $250,000 to the agency. Beside the pool analysis, a micro-analysis of mayoral influence in the agency’s contracting process is used to analyze the agency’s contract decisions under six additional contracting circumstances. The micro-analysis compares the influence of each mayor with the average influences exercised by the other three mayors and the influence of the transition between mayors with their mayoral term.
The general research model revealed that political influence was selective rather than systemic, and that the following four relationship explained change in contractor: firm size explained 6%; price and market competition explained 38%; administrative discretion explained 8%; and selective economic and political intervention explained up to 20%.
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